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: Care and Protection of Indigent and Elderly Patients SB 24

HEALTH
Care and Protection of Indigent and Elderly Patients: Amend
Chapter 8 of Title 31 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated,
Relating to Care and Protection of Indigent and Elderly Patients,
so as to Enact the “Hospital Medicaid Financing Program Act;”
Authorize the Department of Community Health to Assess One or
More Provider Payments on Hospitals for the Purpose of Obtaining
Federal Financial Participation for Medicaid; Provide for
Definitions; Provide for Rules and Regulations; Provide for One or
More Segregated Accounts within the Indigent Care Trust Fund;
Provide for the Use of Funds; Provide for Repeal unless
Reauthorized; Provide for Related Matters; Provide for Effective
Dates; Repeal Conflicting Laws; and for Other Purposes
CODE SECTION:
BILL NUMBER:
ACT NUMBER:
GEORGIA LAWS:
SUMMARY:

EFFECTIVE DATE:

O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179 (amended)
SB 24
1
2013 Ga. Laws 1
The Act authorizes the Department of
Community Health (DCH) to assess a
provider payment on all Georgia
hospitals to obtain federal matching
funds for Medicaid patients. Popularly
known as the “bed tax,” the Act
continues legislation set to expire in
2012. This Act ensures Georgia’s
ability to receive federal matching
dollars through June 30, 2017, unless
reauthorized by the General Assembly
before then. The Act is intended to
avoid the detrimental impact on
healthcare access and local economies
that could potentially result from nonparticipation.
July 1, 2013
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History
First enacted under Governor Sonny Perdue, the Provider Payment
Agreement Act imposed a net patient revenue tax of 1.45% on
Georgia hospitals.1 Representative Kevin Levitas introduced House
Bill (HB) 1055 during the 2010 session for the purpose of giving the
state access to federal matching funds which replenish the state’s
Medicaid budget and provide reimbursements to hospitals. In 2011,
the State of Georgia collected $215 million in Medicaid provider fees
from Georgia hospitals.2 The Act defined net patient revenue to
include the total gross patient revenue of a hospital less charity and
indigent care.3 Further, HB 1055 defined hospitals to include nursing
homes and other healthcare facilities, but exclude statutorily-defined
“critical access hospitals.”4 The Act was set to expire by its own
terms on June 30, 2013.5 Just as the General Assembly approved HB
1055, several other states passed or were considering similar
measures better known as “hospital” or “bed” taxes.6 By the time the
General Assembly convened in 2013, forty-nine of fifty states had
passed their own versions of a bed tax.7
In 2013, Governor Deal’s floor leaders in the General Assembly
introduced Senate Bill (SB) 24 to revise and extend the bed tax
program before it expired.8 The Hospital Medicaid Financing
Program Act authorizes the Department of Community Health
1. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179 (2010) (repealed 2013).
2. Carrie Teegardin & Misty Williams, ‘Bed Tax’ A Windfall For Some Hospitals, A Big Loser For
Others, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 19, 2012, available at http://www.ajc.com/news/news/bed-tax-awindfall-for-some-hospitals-a-big-loser-/nS9hH/; Ouch! Georgia General Assembly Enacts 1.45%
“Hospital Tax”, SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP, May 17, 2010, available at
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dc67d6e5-5f14-498c-8548-929cb43d4861.
3. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.1(3) (repealed 2013).
4. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.1(2) (2010); see also O.C.G.A. § 37-3-1 (2013) (defining critical access
hospitals).
5. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.8 (2010).
6. E.g., Colorado (HB 1293 in 2009), Maine (HB 1351 in 2004), Ohio (HB 1 in 2009), Oregon (HB
2116 in 2009), and Wisconsin (SB 62 in 2009).
7. Video Recording of House Governmental Affairs Committee, Jan. 29, 2013 at 8 min., 42 sec.
(remarks by Sen. Charlie Bethel (R-54th)),
http://media.legis.ga.gov/hav/13_14/2013/committees/govAffairs/govAffairs012913EDITED.wmv
[hereinafter House Committee Video]. Alaska is the only state that does not participate in a similar
program. Id.
8. Jim Galloway, Gov. Nathan Deal’s Solution to the ‘Hospital Bed Tax’ Debate, ATLANTA J.CONST., Jan. 14, 2013, http://blogs.ajc.com/political-insider-jim-galloway/2013/01/14/gov-nathandeal’s-solution-to-the-’hospital-bed-tax’-debate.
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(DCH) to assess a fee on hospitals based on their net patient
revenue.9 Now in its second year, the program is needed to avoid
losses totaling $700 million for low-income Georgians.10 Without the
fee, hospitals would face as much as a 50% cut in Medicaid
reimbursement, forcing many facilities to close.11 In addition to
reducing access to healthcare, this would mean lost jobs in
communities that are already hard-hit by the recession. Among the
hardest hit would be hospitals in rural areas and those with larger
percentages of Medicaid patients.12 Because closing rural hospitals
would drive more Medicaid patients to seek healthcare in urban
areas, SB 24 held broad support from hospital alliances across the
state.13 Led by Governor Deal’s delegation in the Georgia House and
Senate, SB 24 passed quickly through both chambers of the General
Assembly. Those voting against passage expressed concern that the
fee was just another tax on Georgians or that the bill was steamrolled
through the Senate during the first week of the legislative session.14
Under the current legislation, DCH charges Georgia hospitals a
1.45% fee on net patient revenue.15 Although the General Assembly
delegates this function to DCH, the amount is controlled by the

9. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2 (Supp. 2013).
10. Ewa Kochanska, Deal’s ‘Hospital Bed Tax’ Alternative Passes Senate, THE EXAMINER, Jan. 18,
2013, http://www.examiner.com/article/deal-s-hospital-bed-tax-alternative-passes-senate.
11. House Committee Video, supra note 7, at 24 min., 55 sec. (remarks by David Tatum, Children’s
Healthcare of Atlanta); see also id. at 36 min., 12 sec. (remarks by Julie Wendom, Georgia Alliance of
Community Hospitals). Ms. Wendom is the Vice President of the Georgia Alliance of Community
Hospitals which represents non-profit hospitals. Id. She claimed that should SB 24 not pass, hospitals’
reimbursement for treating Medicaid patients would decrease from 85 to 90 cents for each dollar spent
to approximately 65 cents. Id. Others estimated even lower rates, including 59 cents on the dollar. See
Video Recording of House Proceedings, Feb. 1, 2013 at 55 min., 26 sec. (remarks by Rep. Terry
England (R-116th)), http://www.gpb.org/lawmakers/2013/day-9 [hereinafter House Video].
12. See House Committee Video, supra note 7, at 28 min., 12 sec. (remarks by Jimmy Lewis,
HomeTown Health, LLC). Mr. Lewis estimated that had SB 24 not passed, approximately twenty-seven
rural hospitals would close due to their inability to receive funding through the Medicaid program. Id.
Accordingly, healthcare access would be disrupted for 450,000 Georgians across the state. Id.
13. Misty Williams, New Medicaid Debate: Hospital ‘Bed Tax’” Renewal, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Jan. 8, 2013, http://www.ajc.com/news/news/new-medicaid-debate-hospital-bed-tax-renewal/nTp8y
(“Georgia hospitals have agreed among themselves to support the extension of a special fee that bolsters
the state’s massive Medicaid program.”).
14. Dave Williams, Hospital ‘Bed Tax’ Clears Georgia Senate, ATLANTA BUS. CHRON.,
Jan. 17, 2013, http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2013/01/17/hospital-bed-tax-clears-georgiasenate.html?page=all (Senate Minority Whip Vincent Fort (D-39th) claimed there were a number of
alternatives to SB 24 available. One such choice was an increase in the tobacco tax.).
15. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.3 (repealed 2013).
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General Assembly.16 This allows the State to tap into approximately
$450 million in federal matching dollars targeted towards lowincome patients.17 Over the past decade, Georgia experienced a large
population growth, particularly of those needing assistance to afford
medical services.18 With Medicaid costs rising, Georgia and other
“red states” opted out of the federal Affordable Care Act, also known
as “Obamacare.”19 This created the perfect storm for Georgia:
skyrocketing Medicaid costs, a rising population, and everdecreasing federal funding. The population growth and
corresponding demand for healthcare services affect larger hospitals
like Grady in downtown Atlanta, as well as those in rural areas like
Murray Medical Center in Chatsworth.20 Hospital and healthcare
system representatives from both urban and rural facilities testified
during Georgia House Committee hearings on SB 24 and voiced
support for the bill despite the fact that their respective hospital might
be adversely affected by its passage.21 Overall, Georgia healthcare
providers urged state lawmakers to take action in the 2013 legislative
session. The Governor’s Senate delegation introduced SB 24 as one
of the first bills the General Assembly considered in 2013.

16. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2(a.1) (Supp. 2013) (“The General Assembly shall have the authority to
override any provider payment assessed by the board . . . .”).
17. Aaron Gould Sheinin & Misty Williams, ‘Bed Tax’ Clears Final Legislative Hurdle, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Feb. 1, 2013, http://www.ajc.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/bed-tax-clearsfinal-hurdle/nWDHT.
18. Governor Nathan Deal, DEAL: Georgia’s Budget Can’t Take Obamacare, THE WASH. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 2012, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/30/georgias-budget-canttake-obamacare/ (Governor Deal stated: “Here in Georgia—a million miles from Washington’s printing
press—we are constitutionally bound to balance the budget.”).
19. Id.
20. For example, approximately 30% of Grady Hospital’s patients are Georgians on Medicaid and
another 30% are uninsured. See House Committee Video, supra note 7, at 38 min., 48 sec. (remarks by
Matthew Hicks, Grady Health System). Mr. Hicks estimated that should SB 24 not pass, the hospital
would lose $36 million in revenue. Id.
21. See generally House Committee Video, supra note 7.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss1/10

4

: Care and Protection of Indigent and Elderly Patients SB 24

2013]

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

157

Bill Tracking of SB 24
Consideration and Passage by the Senate
Senators Charlie Bethel (R-54th), Rick Jeffares (R-17th), and Bill
Jackson (R-24th) sponsored SB 24 in the Senate.22 After the bill was
first read on January 14, 2013, Lieutenant Governor Casey Cagle (R)
referred the legislation to the Senate Regulated Industries and
Utilities Committee, which favorably reported a Committee
substitute on January 16, 2013.23
The Senate Committee substitute contained several substantive
changes from the bill as introduced. First, the substitute authorized
DCH to assess “one or more” provider payments and to provide for
“one or more” segregated accounts within the Indigent Care Trust
Fund.24 The Committee substitute also compelled the Board of
Community Health (the “Board”) to adopt a rule when establishing
and assessing a provider payment on hospitals, or a “subclass of
hospitals.”25 Moreover, the Committee removed a provision that
required a uniform application of the percentage assessed on all
hospitals.26
The Committee substitute mandated that the Board cease to
impose any provider payment if DCH: 1) reduces Medicaid payment
rates to hospitals as are in effect on June 30, 2012, 2) reduces the
factors utilized in developing the Fiscal Year 2013 capitated rates for
Medicaid managed care organizations, 3) alters any payment
methodology, administrative rule, or payment policy as are in effect
on June 30, 2012, or 4) creates any new methodology, rule, or policy
that has the effect of reducing Medicaid payments to hospitals.27 The
substitute also authorized the General Assembly to override any
provider payment assessed by the Board.28 The General Assembly
22. SB 24, as introduced, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem.
23. Id.; State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 24, May 9, 2013.
24. SB 24 (SCS), p. 1, ln. 3–6, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem.
25. SB 24 (SCS), § 1, p. 2, ln. 35–36, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem.
26. Compare SB 24 (SCS), § 1, p. 2, ln. 37–40, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB 24, as introduced,
§ 1, p. 2, ln. 39–41, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. (“If any such provider payment is established and assessed,
the percentage shall be assessed uniformly upon all hospitals and shall be calculated at an amount to
achieve the purposes of this article.”).
27. SB 24 (SCS), § 1, p. 2, ln. 45–50, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem.
28. Id. § 1, p. 2, ln. 51–53, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem.
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was also given the authority to appropriate any funds deposited into a
segregated account under the statute.29
The Committee substitute deleted a provision that required DCH to
notify a hospital if it underpaid a provider payment and a requirement
that the payment be due within thirty days of the Department’s
notice.30 Finally, the substitute altered the repeal date of the statute
from June 30, 2018 to June 30, 2017, “unless reauthorized by the
General Assembly prior to that date.”31
The Senate Committee substitute was read a second time on
January 16, 2013, and a third time on January 17, 2013.32 Senators
Jason Carter (D-42nd), John Albers (R-56th), Steve Thompson (D33rd), Tommie Williams (R-19th), and Bill Cowsert (R-46th) offered
an amendment on the floor.33 The amendment, which stated “the
aggregate amount of any fees established and assessed pursuant to
this subsection shall not exceed 1.45 percent of the net patient
revenue of the hospital” passed the Senate by a vote of 46 to 5.34
Subsequently, Senators Jack Hill (R-4th), David Shafer (R-48th),
Ronnie Chance (R-16th), and Judson Hill (R-32nd) offered an
amendment to the amendment that stated the amount of fees
established and assessed shall “not exceed those percentages of net
patient revenues set forth in the General Appropriations Act.”35 The
Senate adopted the amendment to the amendment without
objection.36

29. Id. § 1, p. 3, ln. 65–66, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem.
30. Compare SB 24 (SCS), § 1, p. 3, ln. 77–79, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB 24, as introduced,
§ 1, p. 3, ln. 69–71, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem. (“In the event the department determines that a hospital has
underpaid the provider payment, the department shall notify the hospital of the balance of the provider
payment that is due. Such balance shall be due within 30 days of the department’s notice.”).
31. Compare SB 24 (SCS), § 1, p. 4, ln. 106–07, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB 24, as introduced,
§ 1, p. 4, ln. 100–01, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem.
32. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 24, May 9, 2013.
33. Compare SB 24 (SCSFA), § 1, p. 2, ln. 40–42, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB 24 (SCS), § 1,
p.2, ln. 40–42, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem.
34. Id.; Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 24 (Jan. 17, 2013).
35. Compare SB 24 (SCSFA), § 1, p. 2, ln. 40–42, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB 24, as passed
Senate, § 1, p.2, ln. 41–43, 2013 Ga. Gen. Assem.
36. Id. As enacted, the Act reads: “The aggregate amount of any fees established and assessed
pursuant to this subsection shall not exceed those percentages of net patient revenues set forth in the
General Appropriations Act.” See O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2(a) (Supp. 2013).
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On January 17, 2013, the Senate passed the Committee substitute,
as amended, by a vote of 46 to 9 and transmitted the bill to the House
of Representatives.37
Consideration and Passage by the House
Representative Matt Hatchett (R-150th) sponsored SB 24 in the
House, and the bill was first read on January 28, 2013.38 After the bill
was read for the second time on January 29, 2013, Speaker of the
House David Ralston (R-7th) assigned the legislation to the House
Committee on Governmental Affairs.39 The Committee favorably
reported the bill on January 30, 2013.40 The House read the bill for
the third time on February 1, 2013, and on the same day passed the
bill by a vote of 147 to 18.41
Signing Into Law by the Governor
The Senate transmitted SB 24 to the Governor on February 11,
2013. Governor Deal signed SB 24 into law on February 13, 2013.42
The Act
The Act amends Title 31 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated43 for the purpose of continuing the assessment of provider
payments on hospitals, thereby ensuring federal financial
participation in the state’s Medicaid program.44 Section 31-8-179
states the constitutional authority for the legislation and entitles it the
“Hospital Medicaid Financing Program Act.”45 Section 31-8-179.1
defines the entities affected by the Act as well as “provider
payment.”46
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
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Code section 31-8-179.2 authorizes the Board to establish and
assess provider payments, by board rule, on hospitals or a subclass of
hospitals.47 The section further provides that any payment assessed
must not exceed the necessary amount to obtain federal financial
participation allowable under Title XIX of the federal Social Security
Act.48 The Act limits the amount of any fees assessed to the
percentage of net patient revenues established in the General
Appropriations Act.49 Moreover, this section requires the Board to
discontinue any provider payment under certain conditions which
include assessments that are or become ineligible for federal
matching funds and any state modification to Medicaid payment rates
to hospitals as are in effect on June 30, 2012.50 The General
Assembly also has the authority to override any provider payment
assessed by the Board.51 Finally, subsection (b) allows the Board to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the Act.52
Code section 31-8-179.3 requires funds collected from any
provider payment to be deposited into a segregated account for each
payment program within the Indigent Care Trust Fund.53 This section
allows the General Assembly to appropriate all funds deposited but
only for the purpose of “obtaining federal financial participation for
medical assistance payments to providers on behalf of Medicaid
recipients.”54 A hospital must maintain and preserve any records for
seven years that are necessary to determine the amount for which it is
liable under the Act.55 Subsection (d) authorizes DCH to impose a
penalty of up to six percent on any hospital that fails to satisfy a
provider payment within the time required.56 The Department must
also withhold “an amount equal to the provider payment and penalty
owed from any medical assistance payment due such hospital under
the Medicaid program.”57 Additionally, the state may collect a
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2(a) (Supp. 2013).
O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2(a)(1) (Supp. 2013).
O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2(a) (Supp. 2013).
O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2(a)(1)–(2) (Supp. 2013).
O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2(a.1) (Supp. 2013).
O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2(b) (Supp. 2013).
O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.3(a) (Supp. 2013).
O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.3(a) and (b) (Supp. 2013).
O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.3(c) (Supp. 2013).
O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.3(d) (Supp. 2013).
Id.
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provider payment by a civil action, a tax lien, or any other
enforcement means available.58
Section 31-8-179.4 empowers the General Assembly to
appropriate all revenues raised through the provider payment
program, as state funds, to DCH provided such funds are used for the
purpose of obtaining federal financial participation in the Medicaid
program.59 Appropriations from an account to the Department may
not lapse to the general fund at the end of any fiscal year.60
Pursuant to Code section 31-8-179.5, the Georgia Medical
Assistance Act of 1977 continues to apply to DCH unless its
provisions are inconsistent with the Act.61 Finally, section 31-8-179.6
automatically repeals the Act on June 30, 2017 unless it is
reauthorized by the General Assembly prior to that date.62
Analysis
Constitutionality of SB 24
The House and Senate floor debates on SB 24 included questions
about its validity under Georgia’s Constitution. Specifically, some
members considered SB 24 as a revenue measure.63 Georgia’s
Constitution requires all bills that raise revenue or appropriate money
“originate in the House of Representatives.”64 The bill’s sponsors
characterized SB 24 as an “authority bill,” not a revenue measure.65
Other supporters reminded the Assembly that SB 24 is simply a
continuance of HB 1115, which was the predecessor hospital “bed
tax” legislation originating in the House and scheduled to sunset on
June 30, 2013.66

58. Id.
59. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.4(a) and (b) (Supp. 2013).
60. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.4(c) (Supp. 2013).
61. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.5 (Supp. 2013).
62. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.6 (Supp. 2013).
63. Video Recording of Senate Proceedings, Jan. 17, 2013 at 43 min., 14 sec. (remarks by Sen.
David Lucas (D-26th)), http://gpb.org/lawmakers/2013/day-4 [hereinafter Senate Video].
64. GA. CONST. art. III, § 5, para. 2.
65. Andy Miller, Bid to Avert Fee Battle Galvanizes Capitol, GA. HEALTH NEWS, Jan. 15, 2013,
http://www.georgiahealthnews.com/2013/01/bid-avert-fee-battle-galvanizes-capitol/.
66. House Video, supra note 11, at 49 min., 10 sec. (remarks by Rep. Matt Hatchett (R-150th)).
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Despite opposing characterizations of SB 24 in the floor debates,
there have yet to be any legal challenges to SB 24’s constitutionality
brought in Georgia courts. This fact underscores the widespread
support for SB 24 in both legislative chambers and recognition that
failure to pass SB 24 would further exacerbate Georgia’s widening
Medicaid deficit. Another reason might be that Georgia courts,
beginning in the 1930s, consistently upheld the constitutionality of
so-called “revenue acts” as long as both chambers agreed and the
Governor signed the bill into law.67 This despite the fact that some
measures originated in the Senate or as a joint resolution, as was the
case in Grizzard v. State Revenue Commission.68
Grizzard involved a challenge to a joint resolution requiring the
Georgia State Revenue Commission to sell a list of all Georgia
automobile owners when paid a fee.69 Citizens challenged the
resolution’s constitutionality under article III, section 7 of the
Georgia Constitution; namely, that a joint resolution to raise revenue
did not originate in the House and, therefore, the resolution was
unconstitutional.70 The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed.71
Although the resolution was a revenue measure, the Court recognized
the joint resolution was first introduced in the House, and thereby
satisfied article, III, section 7 of the Georgia Constitution.72
Similarly, a court would likely find SB 24 constitutional because the
original “bed tax” measure in fact originated in the House under HB
1115. The reason the Governor’s floor leaders brought SB 24 was to
continue HB 1115 beyond a sunset date set by its own terms.
In a more recent case, Collins v. Woodham, a plaintiff challenged
the constitutionality of the Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention Act,
a portion of which increased the marriage license fee.73 Mr.
Woodham, who inquired about the cost of a marriage license,
successfully argued at the trial-court level that the Act effectively
67. See generally Collins v. Woodham, 257 Ga. 643, 362 S.E.2d 61 (1987); State v. State Toll
Bridge Auth., 210 Ga. 690, 82 S.E.2d 626 (1954); McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77
S.E.2d 531 (1953); Grizzard v. State Revenue Comm’n, 177 Ga. 845, 171 S.E. 765 (1933).
68. Grizzard, 177 Ga. at 845, 171 S.E. at 766-67.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Collins v. Woodham, 257 Ga. 643, 643, 362 S.E.2d 61, 62 (1987).
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raised revenue but was not first introduced in the House of
Representatives.74 Like in Grizzard, the Georgia Supreme Court
disagreed and overturned the trial court.75 The Court noted the Act
was signed by the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House,
and the Governor, and was further deposited with the Secretary of
State.76 Achieving these approvals meant the Act held the status of an
“enrolled act.”77 A duly enrolled act, properly authenticated by the
presiding officers of both chambers and approved by the Governor, is
conclusively presumed to have met constitutional requirements.78
Collins demonstrates the Georgia judiciary’s deference to the
constitutional validity of acts gaining all necessary approvals to
become law. Even despite procedural technicalities, such as a bill’s
precise origin, Grizzard and Collins suggest that as long as all the
steps were followed for a bill to become an “enrolled act,” Georgia
courts will generally not interfere by entertaining a constitutional
challenge to an act based on its origin.79 The same would likely hold
true for SB 24 because the bill ultimately passed through all
necessary steps to become an “enrolled act.” Furthermore, SB 24 is
arguably not a revenue bill governed by article III, section 780 of the
Georgia Constitution because the provider fee is only assessed to
obtain matching monies from the federal government. This means the
assessed fees are more than refunded back to the hospitals serving
Medicaid patients.
Because of the deference Georgia courts generally show in favor
of upholding the constitutionality of enrolled acts, SB 24 would very
likely survive a challenge under Georgia’s Constitution.
Separation of Powers Argument
Members of the General Assembly also raised a separation of
powers concern questioning whether the legislature can
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. State, 135 Ga. 545, 545, 69 S.E. 725, 725 (1910)).
78. Id. (accord Capitol Distrib. Co. v. Redwine, 206 Ga. 477, 477, 57 S.E.2d 578, 579 (1950)).
79. Grizzard, 177 Ga. at 847, 171 S.E. at 765; Collins, 257 Ga. at 644, 362 S.E.2d at 62–63.
80. The current provision for revenue origination in the Georgia Constitution is found in GA. CONST.
art. III, § 5, para. 2.
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constitutionally delegate authority to DCH to set the provider
payment rate.81 Defenders of SB 24 countered that the Act is
constitutional but provided little legal support aside from citing the
Georgia Administrative Procedure Act as adequate oversight of the
agency and noting that no legal challenges have been made since
2003 when the agency first assumed authority to promulgate rules
and set the fees for nursing homes.82 The Georgia Constitution and
case law interpreting the balance of power between the General
Assembly and state administrative agencies, however, seem to
support the argument that this delegation of authority to DCH is
constitutional.
Other Georgia Constitutional Provisions
The Georgia Constitution vests all legislative powers in the
General Assembly.83 Further, it explicitly requires the separation of
powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
government.84 But one specifically enumerated legislative power
states the General Assembly may provide for:
The participation by the state and political subdivisions and
instrumentalities of the state in federal programs and the
compliance with laws relating thereto, including but not limited
to the powers, which may be exercised to the extent and in the
manner necessary to effect such participation and compliance, to
tax, to expend public money, to condemn property, and to zone
85
property.

This provision allows the legislature to use DCH as a conduit to
comply with the federal Medicaid program. Although the ability to
“tax” remains within the legislature’s purview, supporters of SB 24

81. Senate Video, supra note 63, at 8 min., 56 sec. (remarks by Sen. Vincent Fort (D-39th)); House
Video, supra note 11, at 1 hr., 12 min., 26 sec. (remarks by Rep. Brian Thomas (D-100th)).
82. House Video, supra note 11, at 1 hr., 4 min., 09 sec. (remarks by Rep. Edward Lindsey (R54th)); Id. at 1 hr., 21 min., 43 sec. (remarks by Rep. Larry O’Neal (R-146th)).
83. GA. CONST. art. III, § 1, para. 1.
84. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3.
85. GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 2.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss1/10

12

: Care and Protection of Indigent and Elderly Patients SB 24

2013]

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

165

argue that the provider payment is not a tax.86 The definition of
“provider payment” contains no reference to a tax and means only “a
payment assessed by the department pursuant to this article for the
privilege of operating a hospital.”87 Additionally, advocates point to
the provision of the Act that demands any payments assessed be
placed into the constitutionally protected Indigent Trust Fund
Account.88 These funds are then appropriated by the General
Assembly according to its constitutional mandate to expend public
money.89 The Act also limits the aggregate amount of any fee
assessed to the percentages of net patient revenues set forth in the
General Appropriations Act.90 And the Georgia Constitution requires
the General Assembly to pass the General Appropriations Act each
year.91 Thus, the Act’s supporters believe the delegation to DCH to
merely set the payment rate at which hospitals will be assessed fully
complies with the state’s constitutional requirements of separation of
powers and fulfills the legislature’s role in the process.
Georgia Administrative Procedure Act
SB 24 supporters also argue the Georgia Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) is another check on agency authority and provides
additional oversight by the General Assembly.92 SB 24 explicitly
allows the General Assembly to override any provider payment
assessed by DCH according to the procedures contained in the
APA.93 The APA requires a state agency to provide thirty-days notice
to the General Assembly prior to implementing a rule.94 That notice
is then assigned to the standing committees of the House and Senate
with jurisdiction over the agency.95 If a standing committee files an
objection to the proposed rule, and the agency then adopts the rule,
86. Senate Video, supra note 63, at 7 min., 21 sec. (remarks by Sen. Charlie Bethel (R-54th)).
87. GA. CONST. art. III, § 9, para. 6; O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.1(4) (Supp. 2013).
88. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.3(a) (Supp. 2013).
89. Id.
90. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2(a) (Supp. 2013).
91. GA. CONST. art. III, § 9, para. 2.
92. House Video, supra note 11, at 1 hr., 4 min., 09 sec. (remarks by Rep. Edward Lindsey (R54th)).
93. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2(a.1) (Supp. 2013).
94. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-4(e) (Supp. 2013).
95. Id.
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the General Assembly may consider adopting a resolution to override
the rule within the first thirty legislative days of the next session.96 If
the General Assembly adopts a resolution by two-thirds of voting
members of both chambers, then the rule is void even without the
Governor’s signature.97 If the resolution is adopted by less than a
two-thirds majority, the Governor may still sign the resolution which
would void the rule.98
The APA also allows a standing committee to “stay” a rule until
the next legislative session if two-thirds of the committee, after a
public hearing, vote to object to the proposed rule.99 The General
Assembly may then vote to override the proposed rule during the
next legislative session according to the same procedures had the
committee not voted to stay the proposed rule.100 If the legislature
does not adopt a resolution to override the proposed rule prior to the
thirtieth legislative day, the rule goes into effect.101
Georgia Precedent Supports Delegation
Georgia courts have historically upheld legislative delegation to
state agencies. 102 One of the first Georgia cases challenging an
agency’s authority to issue rules and regulations pursuant to a duly
adopted law involved the setting of payment rates applied by the
Georgia Railroad Commission to private rail companies.103 In
Georgia Railroad v. Smith, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld
legislation that created the Georgia Railroad Commission along with
the agency’s authority to set railway rates for passengers and
freight.104 A constitutional provision required the legislature to
regulate the rates, but the Court held that passing a law creating the
commission to actually regulate the railways did not violate the
96. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-4(f)(1) (Supp. 2013).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-4(f)(2) (Supp. 2013).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. For a historical discussion of Georgia courts’ approval of the General Assembly’s delegation to
state agencies, see generally David E. Shipley, The Status of Administrative Agencies Under the
Georgia Constitution, 40 GA. L. REV. 1109, 1111–33 (2006).
103. Ga. R.R. v. Smith, 70 Ga. 694, 696 (1883).
104. Id. at 697–99.
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separation of powers.105 All that was required of the legislature was
to “pass laws to accomplish the ends in view. When this was done, its
duty had been discharged.”106 Interestingly, the Court also cited the
need for flexibility in responding to issues related to Georgia
railways, which is similar to concerns raised by supporters of SB 24
in the wake of massive budget shortfalls, particularly those caused by
the federal expansion of Medicaid.107
In a more recent case, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected a
challenge to DCH’s authority to issue rules related to the state’s
certificate of need statutes.108 A regulated hospital specifically
claimed the APA’s application to the underlying rules amounted to
“legislative acquiescence” thus violating separation of powers.109 The
Court restated the rule that “it has long been recognized that the
General Assembly is empowered to enact laws of general application
and then delegate to administrative officers or agencies the authority
to make rules and regulations necessary to effectuate such laws.”110 It
then held that rules and regulations adopted by DCH to implement
the statute were not laws and therefore did not mix legislative and
executive functions.111 There is a difference, the Court noted,
between the constitutional requirements of enactment, presentment,
and bicameralism for laws and agency-issued regulations.112 Merely
because the standing committees of the General Assembly, after
given the statutorily prescribed notice under the APA, remain silent
105. Id. at 699 (“The difference between the power to pass a law and the power to adopt rules and
regulations to carry into effect a law already passed, is apparent and strikingly great, and this we
understand to be the distinction recognized by all the courts as the true rule in determining whether or
not in such cases a legislative power is granted. The former would be unconstitutional, whilst the latter
would not.”).
106. Id. at 698.
107. Id. at 698–99. See also House Video, supra note 11, at 49 min., 10 sec. (remarks by Rep. Matt
Hatchett (R-150th)).
108. Albany Surgical, P.C. v. Ga. Dept. of Comm. Health, 278 Ga. 366, 367–68, 602 S.E.2d 648,
650–51 (2004).
109. Id. at 367.
110. Id. at 368 (quoting Dept. of Transp. v. Del-Cook Timber Co., 248 Ga. 734, 737, 285 S.E.2d 913,
916 (1982)).
111. Id. at 368. In a footnote, the Court stated “[s]ome overlap of functions between the three
branches of government is inevitable and to be expected. After all, the three branches serve but one
government. Thus, the separation of powers doctrine does not, and cannot, mean a complete separation
in all respects.” Id. at 368 n.5 (citing Ga. Dept. of Human Res. v. Word, 265 Ga. 461, 463, 458 S.E.2d
110, 113 (1995)).
112. Id. at 368.
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as to a proposed rule, this silence does not convert the rule into a
law.113 Thus, agency rules and regulations, if consistent with the
authorizing statute, do not require the legislature’s affirmative
approval under the APA or the Georgia Constitution.114
The Georgia Supreme Court remains deferential to the legislature’s
delegation of authority to state agencies. Although SB 24 supporters
cited sufficient oversight under the APA and continuing a practice
already implemented for nursing homes as constitutional support,
they likely stand on solid ground. The State Supreme Court has long
upheld this type of delegation to state agencies, and one of its first
rulings on the issue specifically related to rates applied to private
actors. Moreover, the APA was recently upheld as a constitutionally
sufficient oversight mechanism, and the Court again reiterated that
agencies may be entrusted to implement a statute.
The Hospital Bed Tax in Other States
Senator Charlie Bethel (R-54th) commented that forty-nine of fifty
states enacted some form of the Hospital Bed Tax.115 Many states
face increasing Medicaid budget shortfalls and see the Bed Tax as the
only way to preserve coverage for indigent patients. But the impact
varies between states, as does the legislation which enables them to
tap into federal matching dollars. This section first describes the
federal-state partnership that delivers healthcare services under the
Medicaid program, and then explores the implementation differences
between Georgia and Colorado.
The Federal Social Security Act—Medicaid Program
Medicaid is a federal-state partnership program intended to
provide healthcare coverage to low-income patients. Title XIX of the
Federal Social Security Act establishes the program as well as the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Beneath this
umbrella, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services manage
113. Id.
114. Albany Surgical, 278 Ga. at 368, 602 S.E.2d at 651.
115. House Committee Video, supra note 7, at 8 min., 41 sec. (remarks by Sen. Charlie Bethel (R54th)).
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the federal portion of the program. At the state level, a separate
public agency or department manages the state program. In Georgia,
this department is part of the executive branch and is called DCH.
DCH oversees Georgia’s state-run Medicaid programs, including
nursing homes. Georgia residents seeking Medicaid coverage must
meet federally-mandated eligibility requirements, which are
determined by income, family size, and other factors.116
Under the federal guidelines, each state must submit a plan to the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services and agree to the terms of
the federal plan.117 States receive the federal portion of Medicaid on a
reimbursement basis. Reimbursements are based off an annuallypublished Federal Medical Assistance Percentages table, which
determines matching funds for each participating state program.
Federal Medicaid laws allow states to impose healthcare fees or
“provider taxes.”118 These fees may be used to access matching funds
from the federal Medicaid program. Federal law prohibits assessing
fees directly against indigent patients or healthcare insurers, but
allows, for example, assessing fees based on a hospital’s total patient
revenue.
Many states experience budget shortfalls in their Medicaid
programs because of the widening gap between federal
reimbursement rates and hospital costs to provide indigent healthcare
services. This cost-to-reimbursement gap was the genesis of the
hospital provider fee, better known as the “bed tax.” The idea is
simple: charge hospitals fees to increase the amount of money
flowing into a state’s Medicaid program in order to access additional
federal matching dollars to offset costs. Although simple in concept,
the implementation details vary substantially between states. For
example, states must determine who sets the fee and the amount
charged. This question is complicated by state-law issues of
legislative delegation of power. Colorado provides a good example in
contrast to Georgia’s approach to solve the same problem.
116. See generally O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179 (2010).
117. The federal Medicaid laws have three basic program requirements: (1) the fees must be broadbased, meaning they are applied to all providers in the jurisdiction; (2) the fees must be uniform,
meaning the same amount is charged to all the providers; and (3) the fee structure may not violate the
hold-harmless provision of the law, meaning states may not create a mechanism to ensure providers that
pay fees are repaid for all or a portion of the fees they were charged. 42 C.F.R. § 433.68(f) (2008).
118. 42 C.F.R. § 433.68(a) (2008).
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Colorado
Passed in 2009, Colorado’s Health Care Affordability Act took
aim at that state’s growing Medicaid healthcare deficit.119 The Act
was part of Colorado’s comprehensive healthcare reform, which
expanded healthcare coverage for Coloradans and sought to reduce
costs of uncompensated healthcare.120 The Act allowed Colorado’s
Department of Healthcare Policy and Financing to implement a
hospital provider fee program and assess fees on all licensed
hospitals in the state.121 Colorado’s Medicaid Hospital Provider Fee
Program offset $50 million of Colorado’s general fund Medicaid
expenditures.122
A similarity between Georgia and Colorado’s provider fee
program is that both allow an executive department to establish the
amount of the fee subject to certain rules and oversight from the
General Assembly. The Colorado Act states that the fee will be
“established by rule of the state board but shall not exceed the federal
limit for such fees.”123 The current federal limit is six percent.124
Likewise, the Georgia Act allows the board flexibility to “establish
and assess, by board rule, one or more provider payments on
hospitals . . . as defined by the board.”125 Both Acts require
compliance with federal law when imposing a provider fee and
permit flexibility for the respective boards to reduce or eliminate
provider fees in response to changes made to Title XIX of the Federal
Social Security Act.
Both the Georgia and Colorado General Assemblies are in regular
session for only a portion of the year. Georgia’s regular session lasts
forty legislative days each year, while the Colorado general session is
120 days. In Georgia, SB 24’s sponsors were concerned about the
General Assembly’s ability to respond to changes in federal law
119. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy & Financing, Colorado Health Care Affordability
Act, Sept. 2010, http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2
Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1251655280877&ssbinary=true.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25.5-4-402.3(b) (2009).
124. 42 C.F.R. § 433.68(f)(3)(i)(A) (2008).
125. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2 (Supp. 2013).
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which may occur outside of the relatively short legislative session.
Georgia’s answer was to empower DCH to manage the fee structure
within the statutory bounds established by the General Assembly.
Some legislators expressed concern that the Assembly was
improperly delegating legislative responsibility, but the statutory
language places several restrictions on DCH’s ability to change the
fee structure. Also, Code section 38-8-179(a.1) preserved the General
Assembly’s authority to “override any provider payment assessed by
the board” if necessary.126
Colorado implemented a different oversight approach for their
program. The Colorado Act created a hospital provider fee Oversight
and Advisory Board.127 The Advisory Board consists of thirteen
members appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate.
The provider fees are “assessed pursuant to the rules adopted by the
state board[.]”128 But the state board is required to “[c]onsider
recommendations”129 of the advisory board and cannot increase the
fees “above the amount recommended by the advisory board[.]”130
Georgia has tighter restrictions in its statute; for example, requiring
assessments not exceed percentages of net patient revenue
established in the General Appropriations Act.131 The Georgia
General Assembly also expressly authorized the Board to
“discontinue any provider payment assessed pursuant to this
article.”132 Further, Code section 31-8-179.2(a) enumerates
conditions where the Georgia board must cease fee assessments,133
highlighting the importance the Assembly placed in DCH’s ability to
respond when the Assembly is not in session.
Georgia and Colorado similarly segregate provider fee funds from
the state’s general fund. Georgia’s provider fees are deposited and
invested as part of the Indigent Care Trust Fund, created under a
separate Code section.134 Colorado’s statute provides that all hospital
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2(a.1) (Supp. 2013).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25.5-4-402.3(6) (2009).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25.5-4-402.3(3)(b) (2009).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25.5-4-402.3(3)(b.I) (2009).
COLO. REV. STAT.§ 25.5-4-402.3(3)(b.II) (2009).
O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2(a) (Supp. 2013).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.2(a)(1–2) (Supp. 2013).
The Indigent Care Trust Fund was created pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 31-8-152 (2010).
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fees must be credited to the “hospital provider fee cash fund.”135
Furthermore, any unexpended funds remaining at the end of a fiscal
year do not “roll over” into Colorado’s general fund.136 Likewise,
Georgia restricts hospital provider fees held in the Indigent Care
Trust Fund from lapsing into the general fund. In fact, Georgia’s
statutory language seems more protective of these funds, claiming the
fees are held “for the sole purpose of obtaining federal financial
participation” and declaring any appropriation for a different purpose
as void.137
Georgia and Colorado’s bed tax programs are representative of the
ones adopted by most states. Recognizing massive state budget
shortfalls—Medicaid as one of the largest deficit contributors—states
implement hospital bed taxes to lighten the load with federal money.
With minor variations on program oversight and provider fee fund
management, the states’ statutory implementations largely perform
the same function: obtain as much federal matching funds as possible
to offset the rising costs of state indigent healthcare.
Robert A. Watts & Christopher J. Delgado

135. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25.5-4-402.3(4) (2009).
136. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25.5-4-402.3(4)(c) (2009).
137. O.C.G.A. § 31-8-179.4(a) (Supp. 2013).
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